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For over two decades, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats have struggled to resurrect a 
lifeless economy. With the 1990s marred by crippling financial crisis, a spate of corporate 
insolvencies, ongoing scandals in Japan’s premier economic ministries, rising unemployment 
and low to negative growth, policy-makers responded with successive legislative reforms 
aimed at restructuring public administration and private governance of the economy. The Big 
Bang financial reforms, large-scale reform of Japanese corporate law, and a restructured 
bureaucracy are representative examples of this reform effort.  
 
One surprising element to this reform effort is civil justice reforms aimed at nearly tripling 
the population of lawyers by 2018. This surprises because it contradicts a longstanding 
government practice of tightly restricting access to the legal profession.1 Currently, 18,000 
lawyers serve a population of 125 million people, about 3 for every 20,000 citizens. Nearly 
30% of Japan’s court districts have one lawyer (or none) practising in the region. Large 
commercial law firms are uncommon.2 The reason for these meagre figures is that the 
government has controlled the numbers who pass the national bar exam. Pass rates have 
never surpassed 5% of takers and have usually hovered around the 2-3% range.3  
 
Unsurprisingly, then, with so few lawyers, Japan has low litigation rates. In the mid 1990s, 
for example, there were only 9.3 cases per 1,000 people in Japan compared to 123.2 cases in 
Germany, 74.5 in the United States 64.4 in the United Kingdom and 40.3 in France.4 Even by 
Asian standards, the rate is low. Based on statistics for new civil cases filed for trial in district 
courts in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in 1995-1996, South Korea had five times as many 
filings and Taiwan about twice as many.5 Some commentators are claiming that litigation 
rates are steadily increasing, especially since the beginning of the 21st century.6 However, 
others explain that most of the increase is attributable to the surge in expedited debt recovery 
cases following the bursting of the economic bubble; ordinary contested cases — a better 
barometer of litigiousness — still remain at relatively low levels.7  
 
Why is litigation so much lower in Japan compared to other modern democratic economies? 
Scholars have long debated this issue.  
 
One of the more popular explanations is the cultural model of Japanese civil justice. This 
model attributes low levels of litigation to Japanese national traits of harmony and groupism.8 
As far back as the 1960s, Japanese socio-legal scholar Takeyoshi Kawashima argued that 
Japanese pre-modern’ culture meant a low demand for legal professional services. As Japan 
modernises, Kawashima predicted, more Japanese would eventually accept litigation as a 
means to resolve their disputes.9 Several scholars have endorsed Kawashima’s thesis, 
although with different normative conclusions. For example, Chin and Lawson10 agree that 
Japanese are culturally averse to law. Japanese attitudes to law have been shaped geographic 
isolation, ethnic homogeneity and religious thought. Instead of law, the authors submit, non-
legal forces ensure social order. Like Kawashima, the authors suggest that only social change 
will bring about a change of legal consciousness; but, whether change happens or not, they 
evaluate Japanese attitudes to law quite positively as “law of the subtle mind”. By contrast, 
Inoue assesses Japanese legal culture more darkly. The communitarian ethic — which carries 
with it an aversion to the individualism of rights-talk — carries real social costs, Inoue 
warns.11  
 
Comparative law researchers have strongly criticised the cultural model and offered 
alternative explanations. One of the first counter-explanations stresses institutional factors 
over cultural attributes. Specifically, this model points to a number of institutional 
disincentives in the legal system which deter litigation.12 For example, Hayley, while 
acknowledging that Japanese file proportionately fewer civil suits compared to citizens in 
other industrialised countries, points to evidence that the Japanese are not reticent about 
asserting their legal rights. Rather, institutional incapacity — few lawyers and judges, 
discontinuous nature of trials, and an inadequate range of remedies and enforcement powers 
— sets up a barrier to bringing suit in Japan.13 Other institutional barriers include a lack of 
pre-trial discovery procedures, high contingency fees, prohibitive court costs and the absence 
of a jury system.14 
 
Yet another counter-explanation is that the Japanese civil justice system is politically 
manipulated. Under this view, political elites — notably, the bureaucracy — manage the pace 
and direction of social change by channelling disputes away from the courts and into the 
hands of government-annexed informal dispute resolution facilities. Adherents of this view 
submit that lower levels of litigation in Japan have nothing to do with a cultural aversion to 
law; it is more a result of deliberate conservative government policy.15 Japanese political 
conservatives prefer informal resolution of disputes because, it is submitted, they view 
litigation as a threat to the political and social status quo and, therefore, take calculated steps 
to discourage litigation.16 
 
A more controversial explanation for low litigation rates in Japan is advanced by economic 
rationalists. They advance economic rationales for Japanese litigating behaviour. Under this 
view, Japanese prefer to settle because damages verdicts are predictable and it is cheaper — 
or economically “rational” — to bargain in the shadow of the law rather than pursue litigation. 
A cultural aversion to law, argue economic rationalists, is pure myth.17 Ramseyer and 
Nakazato, for example, contend that the Japanese preference to settle cases out of court is not 
culturally pre-determined nor compelled by structural impediments in the legal system.18 
Japanese settle because they can predict what damages they might get if they pursued their 
dispute in court and, therefore, simply bargain “in the shadow of the law”. Settling is cheaper 
and quicker than pursuing a court case. This shows that the Japanese are bound by rationality, 
not culture, because they will maximise — not forsake — their self-interest. And it proves 
that the Japanese legal system works, because, if disputants are settling their disputes in light 
of expected litigated outcomes, then clearly law is structuring behaviour.19 Consider, for 
example, noise pollution from karaoke machines, a big problem in congested Japan.20 
According to case law databases, only about 40 disputes result in litigation brought before 
Japanese courts. By contrast, nearly 100,000 cases are heard each year by pollution complaint 
counsellors, an informal dispute resolution service established by the Dispute Law. Under the 
law, counsellors have strong, judge-like powers to consult with residents, investigate 
pollution incidents, and provide guidance and advice. Filing a complaint involves no direct 
monetary cost, does not preclude filing a concurrent (or subsequent) law suit, and allows 
complaints to be heard and dealt with relatively swiftly due to the lack of formalities.  
 
Today, the debate about Japanese litigiousness has taken a new turn. Now, it is less about 
explaining why litigation rates are low; it is more about whether or not Japanese society 
should embrace more litigation. This is quite unlike the nature of the litigiousness debate in 
Australia and the United States!  
 
Even more unusually, the Japanese government has accepted that more lawyers, more 
litigation — that is a more robust civil justice system — is key to Japan’s economic recovery. 
So much is clear from the 2001 report by the Justice System Reform Council 
(“Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council — For a Justice System to 
Support Japan in the 21st Century, the Justice System Reform Council”). In the opening 
chapter, for example, the Report highlights Japan’s “difficult conditions”, especially in the 
management of the political economy, and the need to restore “rich creativity and vitality to 
this country.” The Report goes on to suggest that state-based economic planning must give 
way to a more participatory market economy built on open and transparent rules. “The justice 
system,” the Report submits, “should be positioned as the ‘final linchpin’ of a series of 
various reforms concerning restructuring of the shape of our country.”21 
 
Lawyer numbers and legal education are strongly positioned within this agenda to kick-start 
economic growth through law. The objective is obvious: to expand the pool of talent capable 
of working through the complexities wrought by Japan’s integration into a global economic 
order. Thus, the proposals envision a more rigorous training in law in graduate law schools, 
as opposed to the current system of undergraduate interdisciplinary education in politics, 
economics, languages and law. Graduates of law schools would then sit for a revised bar 
examination and substantially more — as many as 70-80% — would be allowed to pass. The 
Legal Research and Training Institute, the legal training arm of the Supreme Court of Japan, 
would grow in institutional capacity to groom those successful in the bar examination for 
careers in private practice, the judiciary or the procuracy. The end result — an expanded 
population of technical experts proficient in the art of complex problem-solving. 
 
This cuts against prevailing orthodoxy. Most economists argue that lawyers inhibit economic 
growth. Indeed, empirical studies have shown an inverse relationship between the number of 
lawyers and the vibrancy of the economy. Lawyers, many economists conclude, are a drag on 
the economy. Unlike entrepreneurs and engineers, lawyers do not generate wealth; they are 
rent-seekers who contribute complexity and other costs to completing transactions.22  
 
Clearly Japan does not think so.  
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